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 1. Introduction  
News of unexpected increases in tax returns is generally considered good. Yet, a revenue 
windfall is often only temporary, turning into a shortfall with little warning. This is 
frequently the case when a government is overly reliant on volatile revenue sources. An 
obvious example is the revenues obtained from oil royalties or other natural resources 
that fluctuate with the commodities’ international price. The current economic situation 
of Venezuela, for example, can be explained by the country’s failure to manage its oil 
revenues appropriately. The same problem, however, can affect the revenues from taxes 
on such assets as company shares and real estate. A good example is that of California 
and the state budget’s excessive reliance on capital gains taxes, which makes the 
evolution of revenues too sensitive to stock market developments1. Likewise, the 
collapse of the housing market in Spain generated similar problems for governments 
that had become excessively reliant on construction-related revenues. Such situations 
require prudent fiscal management: windfall revenues obtained during a boom should, 
for the most part, be saved. The consequence of failing to save during the boom is fiscal 
stress during the bust when these revenues vanish, leading to abrupt cuts in spending 
and to deterioration in public services, and/or to tax increases. Two excerpts from the 
Spanish media illustrate the situation during the boom and the bust, respectively: 
‘The municipalities (…) see in housing construction their main and most 
tempting source of finance.’ (El País, 10/6/2006).  
‘The bursting of the real estate bubble hit the local council hard and 
construction revenues fell by 96%, leading to bankruptcy. Services were 
paralyzed; payments to workers and providers were delayed. Even council 
members went unpaid’” (Eleconomista.es, 10/2/2011). 
Here, we study how local governments react to temporary revenue windfalls 
attributable to asset booms and how they cope with subsequent shortfalls. Earlier 
papers examining the ability of local governments to smooth spending faced the 
challenge of ensuring that actual revenue changes were not capturing the effects of 
permanent revenue shocks. Our main contribution in this paper, therefore, is to 
overcome this problem by confirming the temporary nature of the windfall revenues. To 
do so, we draw on data from Spanish local governments for the period 1995-2011, years 
in which these governments were affected by a huge, unexpected, temporary fluctuation 
in their revenues, attributable to the housing boom and bust. The reason for this abrupt 
swing in resources lies in the fact that Spanish municipalities obtain a large share of 
their revenues from property transaction taxes, including a betterment tax, a tax on 
                                                      
1 This is well exemplified in a comment made by the spokesman for the state Department of 
Finance, H.D. Palmer: “We know another downturn is coming, we just don’t know when. So we 
don’t want to commit to ongoing high levels of spending – which was the mistake we made 
during the dotcom boom”. See “California tax windfall: spend it or roll back that ‘temporary’ tax 
hike?”(The Christian Science Monitor, 05/20/2015). 
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construction budgets, development and building permit fees, and land sales proceeds 
(see section 3.1).  
Using data from local governments in Spain’s largest urban areas, we perform 
three different analyses. First, we study the average reaction to the boom windfalls. 
With this purpose, we estimate first-difference equations that relate changes in 
spending, savings and tax revenues from the start to the peak of the boom to changes in 
construction-related revenues during the same period. Our preferred results come from 
equations estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS), using the amount of vacant land 
at the beginning of the period as an instrument. The amount of vacant land to start with 
is a very powerful predictor of housing construction revenues. We claim that the 
amount of vacant land (at the start of a boom) is the result of growth forecasting errors 
made by local planners during the previous housing cycles and so it is close to being 
randomly allocated in space, after controlling for urban area fixed effects and within 
area accessibility. Our 2SLS results show that only a small proportion of the boom 
windfalls (around 25%) were saved for leaner times. Most of the extraordinary 
revenues were used to fund spending increases (around 65%) and tax cuts (around 
15%). Current spending was the most heavily affected item (accounting for 45% of the 
windfall), in particular, spending on wages (30%).  
Second, we seek to identify which local governments are least likely to save 
windfall revenues during booms. Here, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that the 
quality of institutions should matter. Although formal legal and political institutions are 
the same across the Spanish geography, elements such as voter information (e.g., press 
readership) and electoral competition (e.g., margin of victory at local elections) do show 
considerable spatial variation. There are some papers showing that better-informed 
voters are less tolerant of fiscal profligacy (Brender, 2005; Arvate et al., 2009) and that 
the workings of local governments improve with voter information (Repetto, 2016; 
Ponzetto and Troiano, 2014). Some papers also provide evidence that contested 
elections introduce a short-term bias into public finance decisions (Pérignon and Vallée, 
2016; Bagchi, 2016). Thus, our second analysis will consist of examining the effects of 
voter information and electoral competition on the failure to save during booms.  
What we find is striking. Local governments in municipalities with highly informed 
voters (one standard deviation above the mean in press circulation) save nearly all the 
windfall, whereas those in places with poorly informed voters (one standard deviation 
below the mean) squander the entire windfall (mostly through spending increases, but 
also through tax cuts). Electoral competition also has an effect on the ability to smooth 
spending and taxes over time: municipalities with low margins of victory at local 
elections tend to save a lower share of the windfall during booms. These results are 
consistent with a model of policy myopia, in which incumbents pander to the interests 
of voters in order to be re-elected. In the paper we perform several additional exercises 
in order to discard that the results are generated by some alternative mechanism. We 
show, for example, that accounting for liquidity constraints (i.e., higher prior debt 
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burdens) does not affect our findings on voter information and electoral competition. 
We are also able to discard that irrational bubble expectations (i.e., high degree of 
revenue persistence during the boom) are the explanation of our results. 
Third, we also examine how local governments cope with the loss of construction 
revenues during the bust. We find that construction revenue shortfalls were followed by 
abrupt cuts in spending (around 70%), tax rises (14%) and deficits (16%). The spending 
adjustment mostly affected capital expenditures and had no effect at all on spending on 
wages. Moreover, we show that voter information and electoral competition also have 
some effects on the reaction during the bust. Fiscal adjustment is slower in places with 
less informed voters and more contested elections; these governments find rising taxes 
much more difficult and, as result, fail to fully adjust the budget.  
The paper can be related to different strands in the literature. First, there are the 
papers that study whether local governments are forward-looking agents (see Holtz-
Eakin et al., 1994; Dahlberg and Lindström, 1998; BØrge and Tovmo, 2009; Persson, 
2015). These papers estimate the response of public consumption to actual changes in 
tax revenues using dynamic panel data methods to isolate the temporary shock. We 
enhance this approach by using a new identification strategy and by digging deeper into 
the mechanisms that can account for the results. Second, the paper can also be related to 
the literature on pro-cyclical budgeting (e.g., Gavin and Perotti, 1997). This strand has 
identified cyclical fluctuations in tax bases (e.g., Talvi and Vegh, 2005) and institutional 
quality (e.g., Tornell and Lane, 1999; Alesina et al., 2008) as sources of pro-cyclical 
behaviour. However, this literature also suffers from identification problems and no 
studies to date have examined this issue with local data. Third, this paper is also related 
to recent studying electorally induced policy myopia. See Bonfiglioni and Gancia (2013) 
and Herrera et al.  (2014) on the incentives to delay reforms; Matsen et al. (2016) on the 
over-exploitation of natural resources; Ponzetto and Troiano (2014) on 
underinvestment in education; Glaeser and Ponzetto (2015) and Bagchi (2016) on 
pension under-funding; and Pérignon and Vallée (2016) on local governments’loan 
choices that conceal the long-run cost of debt2. Some of these studies explicitly consider 
the role of voter information (e.g., Glaeser and Ponzetto, 2014, and Ponzetto and 
Troiano, 2014).3  
Fourth, we contribute to a broader literature that studies how local governments 
respond to windfalls in external revenues. For example, the ‘flypaper effect’ literature 
focuses on the relative share of spending vs. taxes in the reaction to increases in grants 
(see Hines and Thaler, 1995, for a survey). Our focus here is different inasmuch as we 
                                                      
2 The literature on the effects of electoral competition on policy outcomes is more extensive. 
Some of the papers suggest that competition helps curbing rent extraction (see e.g., Besley et al., 
2012; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2012) while others suggest it might less benign if voters are 
uninformed (see e.g., Ashworth, 2015).  
4 These papers are also related to a much broader strand in the literature studying the effects of 
media access on accountability (e.g., Besley and Burgess, 2002; Snyder and Strömberg, 2010). 
Several studies also focus on education (e.g., Glaeser et al., 2007; Botero et al., 2013). 
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examine the effects of (temporary) revenue increases on savings. However, in common 
with various studies in this literature, we seek to improve methods of identification (see, 
e.g., Knight, 2002; Dalhberg et al., 2008). Similarly, the ‘resource curse’ literature focuses 
on the effect of windfalls on levels of corruption and efficiency (see Caselli and Michaels, 
2013; Ferraz and Monteiro, 2010; Brollo et al., 2013; BØrge et al., 2015). Here, we 
analyse a different type of political failure: the inability to smooth spending and taxes 
over time. The effect of revenue volatility and the tendency to over-exploit natural 
resources are subjects that have lately spawned various theoretical studies (see 
Robinson et al., 2015; Matsen et al., 2016). However, although the effects generated by 
asset booms are quite similar to those generated by natural resource booms, there are 
virtually no papers studying them (see Vamvakidis, 2007, and Fernández-Villaverde et 
al., 2013, for exceptions).  
Fifth, by studying the reaction during the bust we also contribute to a literature 
that examines the determinants of fiscal consolidation (see e.g., Alesina et al., 2006). 
There are also a few papers that suggest that fiscal consolidation depends on how 
electorally vulnerable is the incumbent in charge of implementing the austerity 
measures (e.g., Hübscher and Sattler, 2016). Political myopia might also be behind the 
difficulty of adjusting the budget in bad times: if voters are uninformed and elections are 
contested the incumbent might find attractive to delay the required spending cuts and 
tax increases (e.g., Bonfiglioni and Gancia, 2013). To our knowledge no paper has 
previously looked at the effect of voter information on the extent and type of fiscal 
consolidation. 
Finally, we contribute to a recent literature that examines the effect of the housing 
boom-bust on public finances. Vlaicu and Whalley  (2011), Alm et al. (2011), Lutz et al. 
(2011) and Ihlanfeldt and Doerner (2011), focus on local governments in the U.S., 
finding mild effects, due to the stability of the property tax, the main instrument used 
therein. As discussed, taxes based on property transactions are much more volatile. The 
taxation of construction activity might not be a very relevant issue in the U.S., but the 
problem is not confined to Spain. In Europe, Ireland is the most similar case, although in 
that country it was the central government’s budget that fluctuated as a result of the 
housing boom and bust (see e.g., Keane, 2015). The European Commission and other 
institutions are concerned about the effects of asset booms windfalls on the fiscal 
surveillance framework (see Morris & Schukrecht, 2007). Outside Europe, China faced 
similar problems recently4.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical frame-
work that helps us interpret the findings of our empirical analysis. Section 3 sets out the 
empirical analysis: we provide some institutional background on Spain, describe the 
                                                      
4 In a recent report, the World Bank warned about the effects on budget sustainability of the 
over-reliance of Chinese local governments on revenues from land conversion (World Bank, 
2014) and some studies conclude that windfalls are bad for local governance (Kung and Chen, 
2016). Another World Bank report extends these concerns to other countries (Peterson, 2008). 
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identification strategy, and present the data. Section 4 presents the results. We first 
present average results for the boom, then the heterogeneous results, and finally the 
results for the bust. The last section of the paper discusses policy implications and 
concludes. 
2. Theoretical framework 
We present a theoretical framework designed to help organize the different ‘stories’  
that might explain the responses, in terms of spending, savings and taxes, to a 
temporary windfall of construction revenues. We begin by examining the response of an 
informed politician who is concerned solely with welfare. We then analyse the case of an 
informed but office-seeking politician. After that, we discuss the case of an uninformed 
politician that might not be aware about the temporary nature of the windfall. In all 
these cases we focus on the response to the windfall during the boom period. At the end 
of the section, we also discuss the possible responses during the bust. 
2.1. Benevolent politician 
Let’s assume that the local incumbent cares solely about voter welfare and is fully aware 
of the temporary nature of the construction-revenue windfall. To keep the problem 
simple, the welfare of a representative voter is expressed as:  
                                                              𝑊 =Ε(ln(𝑦1) + ln(𝑦2))                                                       (1) 
where  𝑦1 = 𝜂1𝑒1 and 𝑦2 = 𝜂2𝑒2 are the quality of local public services in periods 1 and 
2,  𝑒1 and 𝑒2 are local government spending in periods 1 and 2, and 𝜂1 and 𝜂2 denote the 
quality of the politicians. Let’s also assume for the time being that all politicians are of 
average quality, so 𝜂1 =𝜂2 = 1. The budget constraint of the local government in periods 
1 and 2 is 𝑒1 = 𝑟1 − 𝑠 and 𝑒2 = 𝑟2 + 𝑠, where 𝑟1 and 𝑟2 are exogenous flows of revenues, 
and 𝑠 are savings. The inter-temporal budget constraint can be written as: 
                                                                𝑒1 + 𝑒2 = 𝑟1 + 𝑟2 = 𝑟                                                            (2) 
Revenues are ordinary revenues t (i.e., that do not fluctuate) plus the totally 
temporary windfall of construction revenues c, so that 𝑟1 = 𝑡 + 𝑐 and 𝑟2 = 𝑡. 
Finding 𝑒2 = 𝑟 − 𝑒1, substituting this in (1) and maximizing w.r.t. 𝑒1 we obtain:  
                                                                     𝑒1
∗ = 𝑒2
∗ = 𝑡 +
1
2
𝑐                                                              (3) 
which indicates that spending should be constant over time and in each period equal to 
the permanent revenues t plus ½ of the temporary windfall. So, in this case the marginal 
propensity to spend/save out of the temporary windfall is: 
                                                            
𝜕𝑒1
∗
𝜕𝑐
=
1
2
        and        
𝜕𝑠∗
𝜕𝑐
=
1
2
                                                (4) 
This simply says that a substantial party of a temporary windfall should be saved.. 
This is a well-known result in consumption theory (see Hall, 1978; Japelli & Pistaferri, 
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2010). Of course, the prediction will change if we relax the assumptions implicit in the 
framework. The propensity to spend could be higher with legal debt limits (BØrge and 
Tovmo, 2009), with liquidity constraints (Persson, 2016), prudent but impatient 
politicians (Craig et al., 2016), local multiplier effects (Suárez-Serrato and Wingender, 
2016), and risk-sharing through stabilization transfers or bailouts (Boadway and Shah, 
2007). Some of these influences can be ruled out in our setting; for the others we will 
show they do not alter the interpretation of the results. First, debt limits were probably 
not a big issue in Spain during the period we study (see section 3.1). Second, liquidity 
constraints may have been an issue given the low size and fiscal capacity of some 
governments, but we will account for that in the empirical analysis. Third, local 
multipliers should not be a problem given the small geographical scope of local 
governments and the small income share of local taxes 10 . Fourth, in Spain 
intergovernmental grants do not play any role in absorbing shocks to these revenues 
(see also section 3.1).  
Note also that it is straightforward to introduce taxes in the model. The tax-
smoothing model also predicts that a (benevolent) government would not change tax 
rates in response to a temporary shock (see e.g., Barro, 1979). We can show that 
introducing taxes as a decision variable in our model has no effect at all on the response 
of savings to the temporary windfall; the prior reaction of spending would be split 
between spending increases and tax cuts (results available upon request). 
2.2. Office-seeking politician 
Here we assume that the politician cares about residents’ welfare but also about their 
own re-election. Uninformed voters observe the quality of public services but are 
ignorant of spending and savings decisions. Therefore,  they tend to re-elect profligate 
politicians. This provides incentives to the incumbent to spend in the first period in 
order to ensure re-election. Below, we present a simple accountability model that 
captures this intuition. The model is a dynamic career concerns model similar to those 
in Holmström (1999) and Bonfiglioni and Gancia (2013).  
Let’s now assume that politicians have different qualities, and that it is the function 
of elections to select the politician with the greatest quality. Voters do not observe 
quality but know 𝜂 is distributed U[1 − 1/2𝜙, 1 + 1/2𝜙], with 𝔼(𝜂) = 1 and density 𝜙. 
They also know that quality persists over time and that incumbents losing the election 
are substituted by opponents of average quality. The objective function of the 
incumbent is: 
                                                                      𝑈 = 𝑊 + 𝑅 + 𝑝𝑅                                                             (5) 
                                                      
10 In an extension of the model we show that the local multiplier should be really high for this to 
be an issue. We model permanent revenues as a function of local spending; using a multiplier of 
local spending equal to 2 (the highest value estimated by Suárez-Serrato and Windgender, 2016, 
with US county data) and the actual income share of local revenues we get a marginal 
propensity to consume equal to 0.52 (instead of 0.5). Full results are available upon request. 
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where 𝑊 is (expected) voter’s utility, R are the exogenous office rents in each period, 
and 𝑝 is the (expected) probability of re-election.  
There are two types of voters: uninformed and informed. Before the elections, 
both types observe 𝑐 and 𝑦1, but only informed voters are able to observe s and 𝑒1.12 
Thus, an uninformed voter is uncertain as to whether the high quality of public services 
is the result of profligacy (i.e., under-saving) or of the incumbent’s quality. Thus, the 
uninformed voter has to infer the incumbent’s quality as:  
                                                                           ?̃?1 =
𝑦1
𝑟1−?̃?1
                                                                   (6) 
The uninformed voter will re-elect the incumbent if she expects her quality to be 
greater than that of an opponent of average quality, so if  ?̃?1 ≥ 1, that is if: 
                                                                         𝜂 ≥  
𝑟1 − 𝑠
𝑟1 − ?̃?
                                                                    (7)  
So, the probability of an uninformed voter voting for the incumbent is: 
                                                  𝑝𝑢 =
1
2
+ 𝜙 [1 −
𝑟1 − 𝑠
𝑟1 − ?̃?
] =
1
2
+ 𝜙 [1 −
?̃?1
𝑒1
]                                  (8) 
The situation differs in the case of informed voters. As they are aware of whether 
the incumbent is saving or not, they are able to judge her quality. They vote for the 
incumbent if 𝜂 ≥ 1 so the probability is 𝑝𝑖 = 1/2. If 𝜋 is the probability that the 
representative voter is informed (which can also be interpreted as the proportion of 
informed voters), the re-election probability is  𝑝 = 𝜋 𝑝𝑖 + (1 − 𝜋) 𝑝𝑢, or: 
                                                                𝑝 =
1
2
+ (1 − 𝜋)𝜙 [1 −
?̃?1
𝑒1
]                                               (9) 
And the effect of 𝑒1 (and s) on the probability of re-election is:  
                                                                  
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑒1
= −
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑠
= (1 − 𝜋)
𝜙
𝑒1
                                                (10) 
where we used the fact that, in equilibrium with rational expectations, voters are able to 
perfectly infer 𝑒1 (and s): ?̃?1 = 𝑒1 and ?̃? = 𝑠 (see Holmström, 1999). 
The incumbent maximizes U with respect to 𝑒1 taking into account (1), (2) and 
(10). The F.O.C. is:  
                                               
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝑒1
+
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑒1
𝑅 =
1
𝑒1
∗ −
 1
𝑟 − 𝑒1
∗ + (1 − 𝜋)
𝜙𝑅
𝑒1
∗ = 0                             (11) 
So, we can obtain the expression for 𝑒1
∗: 
                                                      
12 We assume that uninformed voters know the local housing market is booming and that as a 
result of on-going projects the government will obtain a revenue windfall. However, they are 
unable to ascertain before the elections how much of the windfall the local government has 
spent. This assumption is justified on the grounds that the incumbent employs accounting tricks 
to conceal the real amount of her spending commitments. 
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                                                               𝑒1
∗ =
(1 + (1 − 𝜋)𝜙𝑅)
(2 + (1 − 𝜋)𝜙𝑅)
𝑟                                                     (12) 
The responses of spending and savings to a construction-revenue windfall are:          
                           
𝜕𝑒1
∗
𝜕𝑐
=
(1 + (1 − 𝜋)𝜙𝑅)
(2 + (1 − 𝜋)𝜙𝑅)
        and        
𝜕𝑠∗
𝜕𝑐
=
1
(2 + (1 − 𝜋)𝜙𝑅)
                   (13) 
An office-seeking politician has a marginal propensity to spend (save) out of a 
temporary windfall greater than that of a benevolent politician. Note that the propensity 
to spend/save now extends from ½ (in both cases) to one (zero). Note that the 
propensity to spend (save) decreases (increases) the better informed the voters are (i.e., 
so the lower 𝜋) and the less competitive the elections are, represented by the 𝜙 
parameter, which measures the sensitivity of votes to policy: 
                                               
𝜕2𝑒1
∗
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝜋
= −
𝜕2𝑠∗
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝜋
=
−𝜙𝑅
(2 + (1 − 𝜋)𝜙𝑅)2
 ≤ 0                                 (14a) 
                                               
𝜕2𝑒1
∗
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝜙
= −
𝜕2𝑠∗
𝜕𝑐𝜕𝜙
=
𝜋𝑅
(2 + (1 − 𝜋)𝜙𝑅)2
≥ 0                                 (14b) 
The model’s main predictions are robust to a couple of changes. First, we could 
allow the incumbent to choose the amount of political rents. Including two types of 
spending could do this: wasteful (i.e., valued only by politicians) and useful (i.e., valued 
also by voters). The reaction of spending (useful + wasteful) to the temporary windfall 
would be greater than without wasteful spending13. Intuitively, this is because as the 
incumbent obtains more rent the probability of re-election falls and this has to be offset 
by a further increase in useful expenditures. However, the predictions regarding the 
level of voter information and political competition remain. Second, if we include taxes 
in the model with rents the results remain unchanged (the reaction of savings does not 
alter and the remaining is split between spending and taxes). In this variation, rent 
seeking could affect the split between spending increases and tax cuts14, but not the 
overall reaction of savings (full results available upon request). 
2.3. Myopic politician 
Another possibility is that the politician is also uninformed or myopic. For instance, she 
might have imagined the shock to be more persistent than it was in reality. Note that a 
housing boom of an unprecedented magnitude characterized the period we are 
studying. The possibility of agents developing irrational beliefs in this context quickly 
comes to mind (e.g., Glaeser and Nathanson, 2015). Various studies demonstrate that 
                                                      
13 See Alesina et al. (2010) and Matsen et al. (2016) for alternative electoral agency models 
where elections with rent-seeking politicians also induce a short-term bias in budget decisions.  
14 Note that we do not study the intensity of the split between spending and taxes (the so-called 
‘flypaper effect’). This split might also be affected by institutional constraints faced by Spanish 
local governments (as e.g., limited tax autonomy, see section 3.1).  
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people do not readily forecast mean reversion processes of variables that grow 
sustainably over quite a long period (Fuster et al., 2010), which is what occurred in our 
case.  
It is easy to see that this would modify the predicted reaction to the windfall. 
Assume, for example, that revenues in period 2 are 𝑟2 = 𝑡 + 𝜌𝑐 where 𝜌 ∈ [0,1] is the 
persistence of the construction windfall ‘as perceived by the politician’. If the politician 
is benevolent her propensity to spend will be (1 + 𝜌)/2 and if she is office-seeking the 
term (1 + 𝜌) will multiply the expression in (13). So, in order to obtain some evidence 
concerning the role played by irrationality, we should look at whether the reaction to 
the windfall is mediated by a proxy of perceived persistence 𝜌, which is what we do 
lagter on in the paper. 
2.4 The bust 
So far we have focused on the response during the boom period. But how can local 
governments be expected to react during the bust, when the windfall of construction 
revenues disappears? Note that in the models discussed above what happens during the 
bust is a mere reflection of the reaction during the boom (i.e., 𝜕𝑒2
∗/𝜕𝑐=−𝜕𝑒1
∗/𝜕𝑐). This is 
due to the assumption that the inter-temporal budget constraint is balanced. In practice, 
however, the budget would not necessarily be balanced by the end of our bust period, 
which is comprised of just a few years (see section 3.3). In fact, one should expect that 
each local government would choose its own optimal speed of adjustment. This means 
that, on average, the adjustment of spending should be smaller than the value implied by 
a symmetric adjustment that balances the budget (i.e., |𝜕𝑒2
∗/𝜕𝑐| <  |𝜕𝑒1
∗/𝜕𝑐|). Something 
similar would happen to the reaction of savings.  
What about the effect of voter information and electoral competition? Both 
variables will have two different effects –each one working in a different direction- over 
the response to shortfalls during the bust. On the one hand, places with less informed 
voters and contested elections accumulated less savings (or more debt) during the 
boom, so to fully absorb the shortfall they should enact higher spending cuts and larger 
tax increases during the bust. Note, however, that the same reasons that explain under-
savings during the boom may generate incentives to delay the adjustment during the 
bust. Local governments facing competitive elections may fear implementing un-
popular measures (e.g., Hübscher and Sattler, 2016), and the difficulty to sell austerity 
measures to the population might depend on the level of voter information (e.g., 
Bonfiglioni and Gancia, 2013). This second effect would work in the opposite direction 
than the first one, so the direction of the effect of these variables during the bust is 
uncertain. 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Institutional context 
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Spain’s local public finances. Spain has more than 8,000 municipalities, although most 
are quite small. The municipalities constitute multi-purpose governments, and their 
main spending categories coincide with responsibilities that elsewhere are typically 
assigned to local governments (i.e., environmental services, planning, urban 
infrastructure, transportation, welfare, etc.) with the exception of education, a 
responsibility assigned to Spain’s regional governments. Local spending amounts to 
around fifteen per cent of public spending. Own revenues account for more than two 
thirds of current revenues, the remaining third being met by grants. Two thirds of the 
municipalities’ own revenues come from taxes with the remaining third originating 
from user charges. The main taxes are the Property tax, the Local vehicle tax and the 
Local business tax, which account for 50, 25, and 10% of tax revenues, respectively. Local 
governments have the autonomy to fix their own tax rates, albeit within certain limits. 
Maximum tax rates are generally non-binding, although minimum tax rates might be 
binding for municipalities with high fiscal capacity. This means that some municipalities 
that receive a huge windfall and which react by cutting taxes might hit the minimum and 
so, in practice, they may be constrained in their reaction.  
Construction revenues. Spain’s municipalities also generate extraordinary revenues, 
related in the main to housing construction. Chief among these is the Betterment tax, 
which is a capital gains tax on the land portion of a real estate transaction. The tax base 
is estimated using the current assessed value of land and the number of years since 
acquisition. Second, there is the Construction tax, which is paid by the owner of a 
construction project (i.e., either the developer or the homeowner). The tax base is the 
construction budget. Both taxes have a single ad valorem tax rate, set by municipalities 
between certain limits. Most municipalities fix the maximum tax rate as allowed by law. 
Third, there are Developer’s fees, including Building permits and payments in exchange 
for development duties. Developers have the duty to contribute a share of developed 
land (that part required for streets plus 10% of the developed land), or to provide the 
equivalent value in money (see Riera et al., 1991, for a detailed explanation). Fourth, 
there are revenues from the Sales of land plots contributed by the developers.  
 
Figure 1:  Construction revenues and the Housing boom & bust 
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Notes: (1) Construction revenues in real terms; outlay data until 2011, 
budget forecasts for the remaining years. (2) All variables expressed as an 
index (1993=100). (3) Sources: Housing construction and Transactions 
form Ministerio  de Fomento (http://www.fomento. gob.es). Construction 
revenues: Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Publicas (http:// 
www.minhap.gob.es) and own elaboration.  
Figure 1 –which tracks the evolution of housing construction and of transactions- 
shows how these revenues fluctuated over the housing cycle. Note that construction 
revenues more than doubled during the boom (1995-2007) but then virtually 
disappeared in the bust (2008-2011).  This behaviour was particular of this type of 
revenue instruments; ordinary taxes (e.g., property tax) were no affected at all by these 
fluctuations (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). The oscillation was not only abrupt; it had 
a big impact on local budgets. Table 1 below shows that the share of these items in the 
revenue budget jumped from 12% in 1995 to 21% in 2007, before falling again to 9% in 
2011. In some municipalities, the reliance on construction revenues was even larger 
(see Figure A.3 in the Appendix), reaching more than half of the budget at some point16.  
Table 1:  Share of construction revenues in the budget in %  
     
  1995 2007 2011 
Ordinary revenues 80.82 70.37 83.10 
 Ordinary taxes and fees 46.82 40.05 49.59 
 
 
 
 Transfers (current) 33.98 30.32 40.42 
Extraordinary revenues 19.18 28.94 16.12 
 Construction revenues 11.76 21.27 9.02 
 Construction taxes 5.39 9.05 5.13 
 Construction fees 4.15 5.62 2.68 
 Sales of land plots 2.22 6.60 1.51 
 Transfers (capital) 7.42 7.67 7.10 
  100.00 100.00 100.00 
     
Notes: (1) Share of construction revenues measured over non-financial 
revenues; (2) Outlay data; (3) See Table A.1 for definitions and data sources.  
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (www.minhac.es), “Base de datos 
de liquidaciones de los presupuestos de las Entidades Locales”. 
Some comments on the nature of these revenues are in order. First, some of these 
items are in fact intended to finance infrastructure, which means, in theory, the amount 
raised should be used to offset the building cost (Slack, 2002). If this were the case, 
however, no windfall would arise. In practice, this is of limited application, first, because 
developers’ duties also include the direct provision of the main infrastructure 
(including, street paving, lighting, and sewage), meaning that revenues tend to exceed 
by several factors the needs created by the urbanization process; second, because 
developers also provide lump-sum contributions (in land or in money) so that the 
                                                      
16  Good examples are the cities of Madrid and Valencia, where construction revenues 
represented a 50% and a 60% of the revenue budget in 2006, respectively. 
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community can obtain a share of urbanization profits17 (these contributions are not 
designed to match urbanization costs and thus constitute a windfall); and, third, because 
the regulations that should keep these revenues out of the current budget are either 
non-existent (in the case of taxes) or often circumvented (in the case of land sales).  
Debt limits. Spanish municipalities also have the autonomy to use debt to cover their 
capital spending. Capital projects are funded from current account savings, with 
earmarked capital transfers, extraordinary revenues (see above) and with debt. During 
the period under study, legally binding debt limits were in place. The debt burden and 
debt stock could not exceed 25% and 115% of current revenues, respectively. Reaching 
these thresholds does in theory trigger the imposition of a local adjustment plan that 
forces the accumulation of savings during a period of years. However, very few 
municipalities had reached this limit by the start of the boom. Despite this, many 
governments entered the boom period with a sizeable amount of debt inherited from 
the previous crisis. It is unclear as to whether this hindered access to finance in a period 
of plentiful credit, but it might have had some impact on low fiscal capacity 
municipalities, prompting a different reaction to the boom windfalls. The situation 
changed radically during the bust: although formal debt limits were not tightened until 
2011 (Lago and Solé-Ollé, 2016), credit to local governments dried up during the 
financial crisis (Bentolila et al., 2016), affecting governments with high and low debt 
prior debt levels alike. We will take this reality into account when interpreting the 
reaction during the bust period. 
Risk-sharing transfers. Most of the intergovernmental grants received by Spanish local 
governments are unconditional formula transfers (e.g., 80% of all current grants are of 
this kind). The main transfer of this type (the so-called Participación en los Ingresos del 
Estado) has a component in the formula that compensates the municipalities with low 
fiscal capacity. Note, however, that only ordinary taxes (e.g., the property tax) are 
included in the calculation. Therefore, there is no element embedded in the formulation 
of grants that has been designed to compensate for losses in construction revenues. In 
addition to this, we did no find any anecdotal evidence of shortfalls of construction 
revenues being compensated by increases in transfers. However, we will check that this 
is the case by looking at the response of transfers to construction revenues both during 
the boom and during the bust (see section 4.1). 
3.2. Identification 
3.2.1. First-differences 
In order to study the reaction of local budgets to construction windfalls during the boom 
we estimate equations that relate changes in the average value of budget variables 
                                                      
17 See Peterson (2008) for a review of ‘land value capture’ policies. Several of the construction-
related sources used in Spain follow the logic of sharing urbanization profits with citizens. 
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between a pre-boom period and a period corresponding to the peak of the boom to 
changes in construction-related revenues per capita during the same period (see section 
3.3 for more details). This approach helps coping with the year-to-year volatility of 
construction revenues and allows us to avoid modelling the complex short-run 
dynamics of fiscal decisions. Moreover, it also allows us to study the response to the 
boom windfalls during the boom and the bust in a symmetric and intuitive way.20  
A first estimation approach consists of using OLS on equations like:  
    Δ𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 = 𝛼𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 ∗Δ𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 + 𝛽𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 ∗ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
0 + 𝛾𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 ∗Δ𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 + 𝜆𝑗 + 𝜆𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘     (15)   
With e we denote spending per capita and with c are construction revenues (also per 
capita). Δ is the first-differences operator and the super index boom indicates that the 
difference has been computed between the pre-boom and the peak of the boom. The sub 
index i indicates municipality, j indicates urban area (i.e., j=1…69) and k indicates 
distance-to-central city interval (i.e., k=1…4, less than 5km, 5 to 10km, 10 to 15km, and 
more than 15km). Similar equations are estimated for savings (s) and tax revenues (t)21.  
Note that by taking first differences we are getting rid of permanent differences 
across municipalities in the levels of budgetary variables and of construction revenues. 
In addition to that, the equation in (15) controls for base period municipality 
characteristics that might be correlated with trends in the evolution of construction 
revenues (𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
0 ). A similar role is played by 𝜆𝑗 and 𝜆𝑘, which represent a set of urban area 
dummies and a set of distance-to-central-city interval dummies. These fixed effects aim 
at capturing trends common to all municipalities in an urban area (or with the same 
level of within area accessibility) that might at the same time correlated with 
developments in the housing market. The equation also controls for changes during the 
boom period in variables (Δy) that might be alternative channels of influence of 
housing construction on the budget. Two variables that stand out in this group is the 
change over the period in tax capacity from ordinary taxes and in population growth. 
Note, for instance, that housing construction might also have an effect on the growth of 
property tax revenues if new houses are larger, more expensive or assessed at higher 
values. Controlling for shocks in ordinary revenues (which tend to be much more 
persistent) is also important to correctly interpret the shocks in construction revenues 
as truly temporary. Also population growth may be related to additional infrastructural 
needs related to urbanization. Other variables we consider are changes in personal 
income, building density (new construction might be more land intensive), and changes 
in the share of immigrants and of young residents (which might influence the demand 
for local services).  
                                                      
20 See Charles et al. (2015), for a paper using a similar approach to study the effects of the US 
housing boom and bust on college enrolment.  
21From the budget identity (e≈s+c+t) it follows that the effects on spending, savings and tax 
revenues should at to one. This abstracts from the possible effects on intergovernmental grants. 
However, our results will show that construction revenues did not have any impact on grants. 
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Similar equations are also estimated for the bust period: 
       Δ𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 ∗Δ𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 + 𝛽𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
0 + 𝛾𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 ∗Δ𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜇𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘       (16)   
Note that in this case we look at the effects of boom windfalls (i.e., changes in 
construction revenues from the base period to the peak of the boom) on the reaction of 
budget variables during the bust (i.e., changes in spending, savings or tax revenues from 
the peak of the boom to the bust period). Since the shocks to construction revenues 
during the boom are completely mean reverting (i.e.,  Δ𝑐𝑖
𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑡 ≈ −Δ𝑐𝑖
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚, see section 
3.3.2) the estimated coefficient in (16) will indicate whether the budget variables that 
where shown to react during the boom in a given way (e.g., spending increases or tax 
cuts) are also adjusted during the bust back towards its pre-boom levels or instead stay 
at the levels reached at the peak of the boom.  
3.2.2. Instrumental variables 
The main threat to the estimation of the above equation by OLS is the possible 
endogeneity of construction revenues. Note that in Spain local governments are 
responsible for zoning regulations. Municipalities are in charge of drafting the Master 
Plan, which specifies the areas under municipal jurisdiction where building is permitted, 
as well as the many regulations related to type of activity or building densities (see Solé-
Ollé and Viladecans, 2012 and 2013). Local governments determine the amount of new 
land to be converted from rural to urban uses and this affects the amount of new 
construction in the coming years (see García et al., 2015, for evidence) and, thus, the 
amount of construction-related revenues. This suggests causality might actually run 
from spending (or from the other budget variables analysed) to construction revenues: 
municipalities might decide to allow for more construction in order to obtain funds to 
expand their budget or in order to fund tax cuts. This would bias the OLS coefficient of 
the spending and tax revenues equations upwards (in absolute value) and that of the 
savings equation downwards. In addition to this a problem of omitted variables might 
remain in case we were not able to fully account for influences correlated with 
differential trends across municipalities in construction revenues.  
The difficulty in dealing with these issues within an OLS framework justifies the 
use of a different identification approach. We estimate the equations in (15) or (16) by 
2SLS, using as the instrument the amount of vacant land at the start of the boom, that is 
the amount of land already zoned for development in the past but not yet developed at 
the start of the boom22. The first-stage equation looks like:  
            Δ𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 = 𝜌 ∗ 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑘
0 + 𝜇 ∗ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘
0 + 𝛿 ∗Δ𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 + 𝜁𝑗 + 𝜁𝑘 + 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑘                    (17) 
Three main assumptions have to be fulfilled for 𝑣𝑖
0  to be a valid instrument (see Angrist 
et al., 1996). First, vacant land should be able to predict the increase in construction 
                                                      
22 This instrument has been used by Ilhandfelt and Mayock (2014) in their study of the effect of 
land use regulations on the elasticity of housing supply in Florida. Florida’s system of land use 
regulation is based on comprehensive Master Plans and so is similar to the Spanish one. 
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revenues (i.e., 𝜌 ≠  0). Moreover, we know that in order to avoid biased inferences the 
explanatory power of the instrument has to be substantial, that is the instrument has to 
be ‘strong’ (see Staiger and Stock, 1997). Second, vacant land should be assigned in a 
quasi-random way, which means that municipalities with high and low amounts of 
vacant land should not differ systematically from one another (this is the so-called 
‘ignorability’ assumption). Third, the effect of vacant land on spending (and other 
budget items) should be channeled exclusively through construction revenues (this is 
the so-called ‘exclusion restriction’ assumption). In the paper we defend that vacant 
land fulfills the second and third assumptions conditional on controlling for the two sets 
of fixed effects mentioned above. Other controls also considered prove to be of no 
practical relevance. Below we explain the logic behind the instrument and discuss in 
detail why we think it fulfills the three assumptions. 
Instruments intuition. For vacant land to explain the change in construction revenues 
these revenues should be sensitive to housing construction and at the same time there 
should be more housing construction where there is more vacant land to start with. We 
think the first part of the statement is plausible given that most tax bases are computed 
with information on quantities (i.e., housing units build, transactions)23.  
           The second part of the statement depends on some peculiarities of land use 
regulations in Spain. First, the Master Plan specifies the amount of vacant land to 
accommodate the growth needs of the municipality for a given period of time (i.e., 
between fifteen and twenty years). The amount of vacant land some years after the 
approval of the plan is equal to vacant land at the time of approval less the new 
construction during this period. This suggests that the vacant land some years after the 
approval of the plan can be considered as a forecast error (i.e., the difference between 
forecasted and real construction). So, a given municipality might start a housing boom 
with a larger amount of vacant land because politicians were overly optimistic in their 
forecasts of housing demand in previous housing cycles. Note that whether a local 
development project materializes or not is a highly uncertain event, and there is plenty 
of anecdotal evidence of unfulfilled expectations in this respect24. Therefore, it is quite 
possible that real housing construction falls short of expectations some years after the 
plan is implemented.  
Second, the Master Plan is a legally binding document that creates rights for the 
landowners. This means that the development status of a land plot cannot be reverted to 
its previous use without properly compensating its owner (see Riera et al., 1991), 
something that Spanish local governments are generally not able to do. So, past planning 
forecast errors are very difficult to rectify. Third, the process of amending the plan is 
                                                      
23 Prices also play some role in the computation of tax bases but in most cases they are based on 
the assessed value of the property and are outdated due to property value reassessment lags.  
24 For example, there are plenty of anecdotes from Spain on failed attempts to attract big plants 
and on its consequences for the amount of vacant industrial and retail land (see “The industrial 
Estate bubble explodes”, ElEconomista 22/10/2012).  
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very complex and lengthy and the subsequent process of land assembly is also very 
slow25. During this process housing construction tends to slow down, either because of 
legal provisions (i.e., permitting stops while the plan is discussed), or because when the 
local government starts the process the plan already suffers from obsolescence, which 
means that the amount (or type) or vacant land remaining is not enough to sustain the 
current rate of housing construction (Martínez-Mora and Sáez-Fernández, 2009).  
These three facts combined suggest that municipalities with a high stock vacant 
land at the beginning of a housing boom will experience more housing construction 
during the following years. The municipalities with a lower stock of vacant land (those 
where the forecast was more accurate) will at some point start the process of amending 
the plan. However, it will take some time to do so and in the meanwhile (for the reasons 
commented above) housing construction will slow down. In contrast, municipalities 
with a large initial stock of vacant land (due to past forecast errors that could not be 
later fixed) will continue building at the same pace during the whole boom period.  
Strength. The amount of vacant land has a significant impact on windfall revenues 
during the boom, as verified by Figure 2. The upward slope is clear and the F-statistic is 
equal to 19.08. This holds despite the addition of urban area and distance-to-central-city 
interval fixed effects and of different types of control variables (see section 4.1).  
Figure 2:  Growth in Construction revenues v. Vacant land.  
 
                                                                                          cboom =  0.273 x Vacant land + 56.18 
                                                                              (4.39)***                                  (10.36)*** 
                                                                                                        R2 = 0.146 
                                                                                                   F-statistic = 19.08  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) y-axis: Growth in construction revenues per capita between 
base period (1993-1995) and peak of the boom (2004-2007); x-axis= 
vacant land per capita in 1995. (2) t-values in parentheses, ***: 
significant at the 1% level; standard errors clustered by province. (4) F-
statistic is Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F-statistic; the value of the Stock 
and Yogo weak identification test critical values at 10% maximal IV bias 
are is 16.38. 
Ignorability. As explained above, the stock of vacant land at the start of the boom is to 
some extent the result of the accumulation of past forecast errors in the demand for 
housing construction. These forecast errors might be quasi-random as far as some local 
                                                      
25 See Brooks and Lutz (2015) on how land use regulations affect land assembly for the US. 
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governments do not err systematically more than others. There are some reasons this 
might not be the case in practice. For example, forecast errors might not be random if 
some urban areas systematically experience larger housing demand shocks than others. 
In these areas local governments might fear more the risk of falling short of land (which 
mean that interesting projects might flight to another location) that about the possibility 
of supplying too much land (which entails the risk of experiencing haphazard or 
‘leapfrog’ development). This suggests that the local planners of these places (taking 
into consideration these issues) will plausibly convert more land than in places that are 
not expected to grow that much. The way we deal with this issue is by including urban 
area and distance-to-central-city interval dummies in the estimation. By looking at 
within area differences (and holding constant accessibility) we are controlling for 
housing demand shocks that are common to all municipalities in the area. So, we expect 
that after including these fixed effects in the equation, differences in vacant land across 
municipalities will not be systematic. We think this is the case because although some 
urban areas systematically grow more than others, this is less true for different 
locations inside the same urban area; land supply is more constrained locally than 
across areas and, as some places are filled up, development moves to places that still 
have vacant land. Also, many locations inside a given urban area are close substitutes, 
especially if they are adjacent or located at the same distance from the central city.  
We perform several exercises in order to check the validity of this approach. First, 
we study the determinants of vacant land in 1995 (so before the start of the housing 
boom). We are able to show (see Table A.2 in the Appendix) that construction in 
previous housing cycles do have some ability to explain differences in vacant land at the 
start of the boom. However, their effect vanishes after including urban area and 
distance-to-central-city interval dummies. Second, we explore the possibility that 
differences in preferences for or against development and or in the fiscal situation of the 
local government are correlated with the amount of vacant land29. We find that these 
variables have a low explanatory power and that none of them is statistically significant 
(see also Table A.2). At the end, it seems that there are no systematic differences in the 
stock of vacant land. Third, as we will show in section 4.1, the introduction of any of 
these sets of variables in the equation (besides the fixed effects) has no effect on the 
estimation.  
Fourth, there might still be other determinants of vacant land that we are not 
taking into account, and that are correlated with trends in budget variables. To deal with 
this issue we run regressions using changes in the budget variables in a period prior to 
the housing boom (i.e., between 1993 and 1995) as dependent variable and vacant land 
                                                      
29 We control for political variables such as the vote margin and the vote share of left-wing 
parties (at prior local elections), variables measuring voter preferences (i.e., income per capita 
in 1995, % college education, % renters and % commuters, measured with 1991 census data), 
and budgetary variables (i.e., debt burden, spending, and assessed property value in 1995, per 
capita).  
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at the start of the boom (in 1995) as an explanatory variable. The results indicate that 
vacant land is not correlated with changes in budget variables during this period, 
suggesting budget variables do not have different pre-trends in municipalities with high 
v. low stocks of vacant land (Table A.3 in the Appendix). 
Exclusion restriction. We accept that vacant land, by fuelling housing construction, may 
also have some effect on property tax revenues. In addition to this, housing construction 
might also have an effect on employment, which could, in turn, have an effect on vehicle 
and business tax bases. We, therefore, need to recognise the possibility that the 
estimated effect of temporary windfalls impacts other (perhaps more permanent) 
sources of revenues. Construction activity might also impact personal incomes and 
building densities, thus affecting the demand for and/or the costs of providing local 
services. We believe, however, that these effects might also be attenuated by the 
inclusion of urban area and distance-to-central-city interval dummies. Note, for 
instance, that the effect of vacant land on the property tax base depends on the response 
of housing prices, which is determined at the urban area level, and of the frequency of 
property reassessments, which are performed close in time for municipalities in the 
same housing market. The same can be said of the effects on employment or income, 
which tend to spill over to other localities in the area.  
We examine the seriousness of this issue by running different regressions using 
vacant land as the explanatory variable and changes in ordinary revenues (i.e., ordinary 
taxes plus grants), population growth, personal income per capita,  building density, 
share of immigrants, and share of young residents. In all these regressions we control 
for urban area and distance-to-central-city dummies. We show (see Table A.4 in 
Appendix) that vacant land at the start of the boom does have a statistically significant 
effect on changes over the boom period in ordinary revenues (at the 5% level) and in 
population growth (at the 10% level), but not on changes in the other outcomes. 
However, the effect on the growth of ordinary revenues is quite small (i.e., around one 
fifth of the effect of vacant land on construction revenues); the effect of population 
growth is also very small. This means that the exclusion of these two variables from the 
equation could hardly affect our estimates.  In fact, after including the two sets of fixed 
effects, neither the first-stage coefficient nor the second-stage results depend on 
controlling for these variables (see section 4.1). 
Alternative instrument. Another option to quantify how constrained is land supply in a 
municipality would be to use the amount of land under its jurisdiction that is suitable 
for development, that is excluding water bodies or wetlands and overly steep land (see 
Saiz, 2010). To compute such a variable we depart from the amount of land under the 
jurisdiction of each municipality, from which we subtract the amount of land already 
build on in 1995 and the amount of land protected by environmental laws of higher 
layers of government. We then subtract the area of all rivers and wetlands. Finally, we 
divide the land area into cells of 50 x 50 meters and we subtract all cells with an average 
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slope greater than 15%. This variable, also in per capita terms, is our measure of land 
suitable for development. However, the performance of this variable as instrument is 
not good. The reason is that although places with more land do built more and thus 
collect more construction revenues, this relationship is not strong enough (the first-
stage statistic is around three)35,36. This is the reason we do not report in the paper the 
results obtained when using this instrument37. 
3.3. Data 
3.3.1. Sample and period 
We focus on municipalities located in the largest Spanish urban areas38. There are 
several reasons for this choice. First, these are the municipalities where the demand for 
housing was most intense and also where the notion of land regulation constraints 
makes greatest sense39. Second, it is in urban areas that it makes also greatest sense to 
consider the different locations as substitutes, which is an important trait of our 
identification strategy. The urban area delimitations are provided by AUDES 
(http://alarcos. esi.uclmes/per/fruiz/audes/) and are based on commuting patterns 
and the physical continuity of the build-out area. Major urban areas are defined as 
having a central city of at least 50,000 residents and a sizeable conurbation. This gives 
us here a total of 69 urban areas. We also restrict our attention to the municipalities 
inside these areas that have direct access to the road network, defined as having an 
expressway ramp or a direct connection to a major two-lane road as of 1995. The road 
data comes from García et al. (2015). This excludes municipalities that can be 
considered far from the central city in terms of travel time, and ensures that units inside 
an urban area are close substitutes.  
Reasons of data availability mean we have to focus on municipalities with a popu-
lation greater than 1,000 residents in all the years. This gives us a total of 456 
municipalities. We have been able to assemble the required budget data for the whole 
period of analysis (1993-2011) for 311 of these. These data are drawn from a survey 
that covers all the largest municipalities (i.e., above 5,000 residents) and a sample of the 
smaller ones, and was undertaken by the Spanish Ministry of Finance. The selection of 
                                                      
35 The weakness of the instrument might be related to the fact that the amount of land suitable 
for development is irrelevant in the presence of urban growth controls. See Cox (2011) for a 
discussion of this issue, and Ilhandfelt and Mayock (2014) and Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) for 
evidence that regulatory barriers matter more than geographical constraints.  
36 This variable is correlated with past housing construction and population size (i.e., growing 
cities deplete the stock of land suitable for development). We found, however, that the variable 
is ignorable conditional on fixed effects (as also happened to vacant land). However, the 
introduction of these controls renders the instrument even weaker.  
37 Full results of the estimation are, however, available upon request. The data sources used for 
the computation of this instrument can be found in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
38 The urban areas of the Canary Island, Balearic Islands, Basque Country and Navarra had to be 
excluded from the analysis due to data availability issues. 
39 Note that many municipalities in rural areas do not have Master Plans and instead use 
simplified land planning mechanisms (see Martínez-Mora and Sáez-Fernández, 2009). 
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the small municipalities into the survey was in theory random so our final sample 
should be representative. This intuition is confirmed after comparing the values of the 
variables in the restricted sample to its value in the sample that includes all 
municipalities. Results are available upon request. 
3.3.2. Data sources  
Construction revenues. These are revenues derived from the Betterment tax and the 
Construction tax and from Developer’s fees and Sales of land (see section 3.1). These 
revenues (as all the budget data) have been computed from outlay data and have been 
deflated using a provincial price index provided by the National Institute of Statistics 
(www.ine.es)42. Windfalls are increases in per capita revenues from these taxes between  
a base pre-boom period (1993-95) and a period covering the years at the peak of the 
boom (2004-07). Shortfalls are defined as decreases in revenues per capita from these 
taxes between the peak of the boom (2004-07) and the bust (2008-11)43.  Figure 3 
shows that windfalls and shortfalls are perfectly negatively correlated.  
Figure 3: Mean reversion in Construction Revenues 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              cbust =  -0.995 x cboom + 22.31 
                                                                            (-51.50)***                    (8.54)*** 
                                     R2 = 0.901 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) y-axis: Growth in construction revenues per capita 
during the boom; x-axis= Growth in construction revenues per 
capita during the bust. (2) t-values in parentheses, ***: 
significant at the 1% level; standard errors clustered by 
province. 
Budget data. Changes in all the budgetary variables studied are defined in the same way 
as for construction revenues: differences in real average outlays per capita between 
terms. Spending is total non-financial spending, Revenues are total non-financial 
revenues (tax revenues – construction revenues + grants), and Savings are Revenues – 
Spending. We also analyse the breakdown of spending into Current and Capital 
                                                      
42 Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the data sources for all variables. 
43 We fix the pre-boom period in 1993-95 as to ensure that vacant land is measured before 
housing construction starts to rise. The boom begins not earlier than 1997 and it is not 
perceptible in most urban areas before of 1999. The results are robust to the use of different 
years to define the boom and bust periods. 
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spending, and the breakdown of current spending into Wages, Purchases and Transfers.  
Ordinary revenues are tax revenues + grants. We also compute Net Savings (Current 
revenues – Current Spending – Debt principal), a variable used in the interaction 
analysis. 
Land use data. The amount of vacant land has been obtained from a database provided 
by the National Property Assessment Office (the so-called Catastro), which assesses 
property values across Spain. A by-product of the work undertaken to update its 
property register is a complete database on the status of all land plots in Spain. This 
database can be accessed online (http://www.catastro.meh.es/esp/estadisticas.asp) 
and provides information of the amount of land classified, since 1995, as developed, 
developable (not yet developed but legally developable), and not developable. The 
amount of developable land is what we refer to here as vacant land; the value of this 
variable in 1995, in per capita terms, is what we use as our instrument44.   
Control variables. We use a variety of control variables from a number of sources, the 
most important being the Housing Census for 2001 and 1991. This data source provides 
us with annual housing construction statistics, insofar as it records the year of 
construction of all housing in the country. This and the 1991 Population Census 
furnishes information on the socio-demographic variables used here as controls 
(including, % renters and % commuters) and/or in the interaction analysis (including, 
% unemployed and % college education). Proxies for employment and income per 
capita are described in Table A.1 in the Appendix. Building density has been computed 
as the build-out area (according to the Cadastre database) and resident population.  
4. Results   
4.1. First stage  
In Table 2 we present the results obtained when estimating the first-stage equation, 
including the different types of controls. In column (1), we do not include any controls; 
in column (2), we include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects; 
in column (3), we also control for housing demand (i.e., past housing construction and 
population size); in column (4), we include variables that proxy for fiscal stress 
(spending, debt burden, and property tax base, per capita) and political (voting margin 
and left-wing voting) and citizen preferences (personal income, % renters, % 
commuters, and % college educated); and, finally, in column (5), we control for changes 
over the boom period in variables that might constitute alternative channels of influence 
of housing construction on local budgets (i.e., ordinary revenues and population 
growth).  
Table 2:  First stage results 
                                                      
44 See Figure A.4 in the Appendix for a graphical illustration of the concept of vacant land. 
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 Construction revenues p.c. (cboom) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Vacant land p.c. (𝜐0) 
0.273 
(4.39)*** 
0.234 
(4.21)*** 
0.225 
(4.13)*** 
0.210 
(4.71)*** 
0.219 
(4.01)*** 
      
      
R2 (adj.) 0.145 0.406 0.423 0.425 0.483 
K-P F-statistic 19.08 
 
18.33 
 
18.80 
 
19.02 
 
17.21 
 
 [16.38 / 8.96 / 6.66] 
      
Urban area fixed effects  NO YES YES YES YES 
Distance-to-central city fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES 
Housing demand  NO NO YES NO NO 
  Preferences and fiscal stress NO NO NO YES NO 
Alternative channels  NO NO NO NO YES 
      Notes: (1) Dependent variable is increase in construction revenues per capita during the boom 
period; (2) Sample: municipalities in larger Spanish urban areas larger than 1,000 inhabitants and 
with access to the main road network (N=311); (3) t-statistic in parenthesis; ***. ** & *=statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; standard error clustered by province; (4) K-P F statistic: 
Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F-statistic; in brackets Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values at 
10%/15% and 20% maximal IV bias.  
Table 2 highlights the stability of the coefficient. Only after including the fixed 
effects does the first-stage coefficient fall slightly. The introduction of the other controls 
does not change the outcomes at all. The instrument appears to be strong in all cases, 
given that the Kleibergen-Papp Wald rk F-statistic is always higher than the Stock-Yogo 
weak ID test critical value at a 10% maximal IV bias. 
4.2. The boom  
In Table 3 we present the 2SLS results for spending, savings, and tax revenues, 
sequentially adding the different sets of controls as in Table 2. In the case of spending, 
the coefficient falls from around 0.9 when no controls are included to around 0.65 when 
we add the fixed effects. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level; 
neither the value of the coefficient nor its statistical significance changes when other 
controls are included. The coefficients of savings and tax revenues also remain stable 
after adding the fixed effects. In the case of savings, the coefficient rises from zero to 
around 0.25, but the estimation of this effect is very imprecise. The effect on tax 
revenues is around -0.1, and becomes statistically significant at the 10% level after the 
inclusion of the fixed effects. The results suggest that for every 100 euros of windfall, 
around 25 were saved and around two thirds were used to fund spending increases. 
This latter result is statistically different from zero at the 1% level, so we can conclude 
that Spanish local governments do not smooth their spending over time and seem to 
overreact to temporary windfalls in construction revenues.  
Table 3: Average effect on main budget items. Boom period. 2SLS results. 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     
 
(a) Spending p.c. (eboom) 
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Construction revenues p.c. (cboom) 0.891 
(4.25)*** 
0.652 
(2.41)*** 
0.647 
(2.48)*** 
0.630 
(2.44)** 
0.651 
(2.19)** 
            
 (b) Savings p.c. (sboom) 
      
      
Construction revenues p.c. (cboom) 
0.009 
   (0.04) 
0.251 
(1.52) 
0.264 
(1.40) 
0.251 
(1.55) 
0.243 
(1.41) 
            
  
 (c) Tax revenues p.c. (tboom) 
  
      
Construction revenues p.c. (cboom) 
-0.100 
   (-1.29) 
-0.115 
(-1.84)* 
-0.120 
(-1.88)* 
-0.113 
(-1.92)* 
-0.125 
(-1.73)* 
      
      
Urban area fixed effects  NO YES YES YES YES 
Distance-to-central-city fixed effects  NO YES YES YES YES 
Housing demand   NO NO YES NO NO 
Preferences and fiscal stress  NO NO NO YES NO 
Alternative channels  NO NO NO NO YES 
      
    Notes:  See Table 2. 
The OLS results (see Table A.5 in the Appendix) suggest an even higher degree of 
over-spending (under-savings), since the spending coefficient is around one and the 
savings and taxes coefficients are zero, and do not change very much when fixed effects 
and the control variables are included. A Hausman test verifies that the 2SLS and the 
OLS are statistically different. The difference between the 2SLS and the OLS coefficients 
suggests that the OLS results are upwardly biased for spending and taxes (in absolute 
value) and downward biased for savings. This might be due, among many possibilities, 
to the fact that the municipalities that expand their spending budgets or that cut taxes 
most are also the ones that convert more land and obtain larger windfalls.  
Table 4: Average effect on detailed budget items. Boom period. 2SLS results. 
 Spending Revenues 
 
Capital 
Current  Tax Revenues 
Grants 
 Total Wage Transfers Property  Other 
Construction revenues 
p.c (cboom) 
0.209 
(1.97)** 
0.448 
(3.56)*** 
0.281 
(3.45)*** 
0.167 
(1.67)* 
-0.100 
(-2.57)*** 
-0.015 
(-0.31) 
0.051 
(0.20) 
Notes:  (1)  All equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects. See Tables 2 & 
3. (2) See Table A.1 for definitions of the different budget items analysed. 
Table 4 presents the 2SLS results for a detailed breakdown of the budget categories. 
First, we show that the spending response is allocated as follows: two thirds goes to 
current spending (45 out of each 100 euros of windfalls) and one third to capital 
spending (20 euros). Even if we consider the capital spending response difficult to 
interpret (since this spending might either bring future benefits and/or is influenced by 
liquidity constraints), the effect on current spending is still quite large. Note also that 
the spending response is dedicated mainly to wages (28 euros or two thirds of the 
spending response). Due to the lack of a more detailed breakdown for this spending 
type, we are unable to say whether this spending is made up of salary raises, new 
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permanent hires or just temporary jobs. Note, however, that since both cutting salaries 
and the layoff of workers are politically costly, assuming this type of commitment out of 
a temporary windfall might entail certain financial risks. 
4.3. Heterogeneous effects 
In this section we investigate whether the failure to smooth spending and taxes over 
time is a generalized problem of all Spanish municipalities or, instead, there are 
differences among them. The model presented in section two suggests that the 
propensity to spend out of the construction revenue windfall will be larger in places 
with poorly informed voters and contested elections. So, first, we estimate equations 
that include interactions between the increase in construction revenues and proxies of 
voter information and electoral competition. After that we look at whether the results 
regarding these interactions are robust to the inclusion of additional interactions that 
account for alternative explanations. For example, in the case of spending, we will 
estimate: 
Δ𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 = [𝛼 + 𝛿 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘
0 + 𝜎 ∗ 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑘
0 ] ∗Δ𝑐𝑖
𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 + 𝜃 ∗ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘
0 + 𝜗 ∗ 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑘
0 + 𝜓𝑗 + 𝜓𝑘 + 𝜉𝑖    (18) 
where 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘
0  represents a variable measuring either for voter information or electoral 
competition and  𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑘
0  represent potential confounders, that is, variables that might be 
correlated with voter information or electoral competition and which could also 
plausibly have an effect on the reaction to the windfall, according to some alternative 
story. The variables in 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘
0  and 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑘
0  are demeaned. This means, for example, that the 
parameter 𝛼 tell us about the effect of a voter information variable at the mean while 𝛿 
measures the effect at different levels above or below the mean. 
The variables included in 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑘
0  are the following. First, we use a proxy of press 
circulation at the start of the boom (i.e., number of newspapers sold per capita). This 
variable has been selected because it fits our theory well and because they have been 
used previously in the literature (e.g., Besley and Burgess, 2002). Second, we use a proxy 
of political competition, measured as the difference between the voting shares of the 
two most voted parties at local elections. Similar variables have also been used in the 
literature (e.g., Besley et al., 2010). Our variable is measured prior to the period of 
analysis in order to avoid picking up any impact from windfalls on electoral competition. 
Nevertheless, the variable is a powerful predictor of the degree of electoral competition 
both during the boom and during the bust period45.  
Third, we also present some results with alternative variables, namely, the share of 
residents with college education, the tenure in office of the main party in the local 
government (i.e., the number of terms this party held the mayoralty since 1979), and the 
                                                      
45 The correlation between our vote margin variable and the one computed with data from the 
elections held during the boom (i.e., 1999 and 2003) is 0.67, and the correlation with the local 
elections held just before the bust (i.e., those of 2007) is around 0.45. 
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number of civic associations per capita. The first variable is also a proxy of voter 
information and has been previously used in the literature (Arvate et al., 2009). The 
second one is an alternative measure of electoral competition. The third one is a 
measure of social capital; some authors suggest that social capital, in addition to voter 
information, might also mitigate political myopia (Ponzetto and Troiano, 2014).  
The variables included in 𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑘
0  are the following. First, we add interactions with 
proxies for the strength of the liquidity constraints. The main variable we use is net 
savings per capita at the start of the boom, where net savings are defined as current 
savings (current revenues – current spending including interest payments) less debt 
principal. Net savings are low when the debt burden is large and/or revenues are low 
and it is therefore an indicator of the capacity to repay the debt. Moreover, this indicator 
is used by higher layers of government in charge to oversee the financial situation of 
municipalities and also by lenders. Additionally, to see whether the results are robust to 
the choice of any particular proxy for the financial situation of the municipality, we will 
repeat the analysis using other variables: debt burden per capita, ordinary revenues per 
capita, and net savings and debt burden as a share of ordinary revenues.  
Third, we also add interactions with variables that aim to measure whether local 
politicians hold irrational expectations with respect to the possible future evolution of 
construction revenues. As we already explained in section two, if the ‘perceived’ level of 
persistence of construction revenues is larger than zero, the temporary windfall might 
end up being considered as permanent. The long housing boom period coupled with the 
tendency to extrapolate the evolution of revenues based on recent information might 
explain this behaviour (see e.g., Fuster et al., 2012). The main variable we use to proxy 
for these influences is an estimate of the persistence parameter ; we assume that at the 
peak of the boom local politicians were forecasting future construction revenues as 𝜌𝑐 
and that 𝜌 was obtained after observing how construction revenues evolved during the 
different phases of the boom. More concretely, what we do is to use municipal level data 
to run regression between construction revenues per capita averaged for the period 
2004-2007 and construction revenues per capita during 1999-2003. We run the 
regression separately for each Spanish province and the estimated coefficient is our 
proxy for the perceived persistence of construction revenues. The logic of this 
procedure is that in places where construction revenues during the peak of the boom 
remained as high as in the first phase of the boom we could expect that local politicians 
may have been confused about the true nature of the windfall. In addition to this 
variable, we will repeat the analysis including interactions with the average annual 
growth rate of housing prices during the boom and also with the average annual rate of 
housing construction. The idea here is that places with higher price appreciation and/or 
more construction during the boom could have developed more irrational expectations.    
The sources for these variables are as follows. Press circulation is computed at the 
provincial level (there are 50 provinces in Spain) as the number of daily newspapers 
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sold per capita in 1995. This is the best statistic we can obtain for the mid-1990s46. The 
electoral competition variable has been computed as the difference between the first 
and second most voted parties at local elections prior to our period of analysis (i.e., 
those held between 1979 and 1995). The Ministry of the Interior provides these data. 
The data on Civic associations also comes from the Ministry of the Interior and is also 
measured at the provincial level. Housing price data are provided by the Spanish 
Ministry of Public Works and are measured at the provincial level. Housing construction 
data comes from the census and it is measured at the municipality level. 
Fiscal myopia. In Table 5 we examine the effect of the level of voter information and 
electoral competition on the reactions in local government spending (columns 1 to 3) , 
savings (columns 4 to 6) and taxes (columns 7 to 9) during the boom. In columns 1, 4 
and 7 we present the results when including in the equation an interaction with the 
level of press circulation. Columns 2, 5 and 8 present the results with an interaction with 
the vote margin. In columns 3, 6 and 9 we introduce the two interactions at the same 
time. In the case of spending, the coefficients of the interacted variables are always 
negative, indicating that places with less informed voters and with more contested 
elections overspend more. Similar results are obtained for savings. In the case of tax 
revenues the interaction coefficient is positive (suggesting that in places with more 
informed voters taxes are cut less when there is a windfall) but they are very small and 
the standard errors are quite large.  
Table 5: Fiscal myopia. Boom period. 2SLS results. 
Notes:  (1)  All equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects. See Tables 2 & 3. (2) 
See Table A.1 for definitions of the different budget items analysed. (3) K-P F-statistic: Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F-
statistic; in brackets Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values at 10%/15% and 20% maximal IV bias.  
To gauge the quantitative relevance of these findings it is better to consider the 
marginal effects, which are reported in Figure 4. Panel (a) shows that the level of voter 
                                                      
46 The information comes from the Spanish media association (AIMC, www.aimc.es). For more 
recent periods, press circulation survey data could also be used (see www.cis.es). The two 
variables are, however, very highly correlated (results upon request). The variable is also highly 
persistent: the correlation of the 1995 values and those of 1999, 2003 and 2007 is around 0.9. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
(a) Spending p.c. (eboom) (b) Savings p.c. (sboom) (c) Tax revenues p.c. (tboom) 
Construction revenues 
p.c (cboom) 
0.673 
(3.59)*** 
0.682 
(2.77)*** 
0.628 
(2.96)*** 
0.223 
(1.42) 
0.184 
(1.56) 
0.182 
(1.63) 
-0.100 
(-1.95)* 
-0.116 
(-2.02)** 
-0.123 
(-2.23)** 
   Press  circulation  p.c. -0.016 
(-2.53)** 
--.-- 
-0.015 
(-2.23)** 
0.019 
(3.04)*** 
--.-- 
0.015 
(2.19)** 
0.002 
(1.08) 
--.-- 
0.002 
(1.14) 
   % Vote margin 
--.-- 
-0.022 
(-1.47) 
 
 
-0.018 
(-1.56) 
 
 
--.-- 
0.028 
(2.30)** 
0.018 
(1.32) 
--.-- 
0.009 
(1.48) 
0.009 
(1.28) 
K-P F-statistic 9.64 8.93 6.95 9.64 8.93 6.95 9.64 8.93 6.95 
 [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] 
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information has a sizable impact on the response recorded by spending and savings to 
temporary windfalls. Notice that if we take into consideration one standard deviation in 
press circulation below/above the average (indicated by the long-dashed vertical lines), 
the marginal propensity to spend moves from one to zero. The graph confirms that in 
the case of tax revenues the marginal effect is growing with the vote margin but remains 
small and it is not statistically different from zero for the whole range of values of the 
interacted variable.  
Panel (b) displays the marginal effects for the vote margin variable. Note from the 
graph that the range of variation of the marginal propensity to spend out of the windfall 
is lower that it was in the case of press circulation. At one standard deviation below the 
average the marginal propensity to spend is again 1 but at one standard deviation above 
the average it is just 0.5. Note that in any case, however, due to the fact that the 
interacted coefficient is less precisely estimated, we cannot reject the null that these two 
values are one and zero, respectively. The effects on savings are similar: at one standard 
deviation below (above) the average the marginal propensity to save is zero (one half). 
We cannot reject the null that the marginal propensity to spend is zero in the first case, 
but we can reject the null that it is one in the second. Finally, the marginal effects are 
quite flat in the case of tax revenues. Here the slope of the graph also suggests that 
higher vote margins mean lower tax cuts in response to the windfalls, but the effect is 
very small. 
Figure 4: Fiscal myopia. Boom period. Marginal effects. 
(i) Spendinc p.c. (eboom) (ii) Savings p.c. (sboom) (iii) Tax revenues p.c. (tboom) 
Panel (a): Press circulation p.c. 
   
Panel (a): % Vote margin 
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Notes: (1) Effect of an increase in construction revenues during the boom at different levels of Press circulation and 
% Vote margin. (2) Marginal effects computed using results from column (3) of Table 6. 
To see whether these results are due to the use of some specific variables, we 
repeated the analysis using other measures of voter information and electoral 
competition. We used the share of college-educated residents as an alternative measure 
of political competition and the tenure in office in the local government (i.e., the number 
of terms of office since 1979 during which the main party held the mayoralty). We also 
introduced an interaction with the number of civic associations per capita, which is a 
common measure of social capital. These results are presented in Table A.6 in the 
Appendix. The results regarding the first two variables are quite similar to the ones 
presented above: the interactions with the share of college residents and with turnover 
are statistically significant in the case of spending and savings and the size of the effect 
is quite big. The marginal effects graphs (available upon request) are very similar to the 
ones presented for press circulation and vote margin. Finally, the results are not affected 
at all by the number of civic associations (whose coefficient is positive but very small 
and not statistically significant).  
Table 6: Liquidity constraints. Boom period. 2SLS results. 
Notes:  (1)  All equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects. See Tables 2 & 3. (2) 
See Table A.1 for definitions of the different budget items analysed. (3) K-P F-statistic: Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F-
statistic; in brackets Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values at 10%/15% and 20% maximal IV bias. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   (8) (9) 
 
(a) Spending p.c. (eboom) (b) Savings p.c. (sboom) (c) Tax revenues p.c. (tboom) 
Construction revenues 
p.c (cboom) 
0.634 
(2.80)*** 
0.633 
(2.07)*** 
0.667 
(2.19)*** 
0.189 
(1.42) 
0.210 
(1.60) 
0.236 
(2.01)** 
-0.100 
(-1.95)* 
-0.091 
(-1.67)* 
-0.088 
(-1.81)* 
    Net savings p.c. -0.004 
(-1.11) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.33) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.001 
(-0.86) 
-0.001 
(-1.01) 
-0.001 
(-1.14) 
   Press  circulation  p.c. 
--.-- 
-0.018 
(-2.24)** 
--.-- --.-- 
0.017 
(2.13)** 
--.-- --.-- 
-0.001 
(-0.55) 
--.-- 
   % Vote margin 
--.-- --.-- 
-0.020 
(-1.44) 
 
 
--.-- --.-- 
0.025 
(1.43) 
--.-- --.-- 
0.001 
(0.25) 
K-P F-statistic 9.83 8.40 7.59 9.83 8.40 7.59 9.83 8.40 7.59 
 [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] 
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Alternative explanations. In Tables 6 and 7 we examine two other possible sources of 
heterogeneity in the response of the budget variables to construction windfalls.  Table 6 
explore the role of liquidity constraints. With this purpose we add to the equation an 
interaction between windfall revenues and net savings per capita. Columns (1), (4) and 
(7) include this interaction alone; columns (2), (5) and (8) also add the interaction with 
press circulation, and columns (3), (6) and (9) the interaction with vote margin. The 
results reported in the table show that the coefficient of the interaction with net savings 
is negative in the case of the spending and the tax revenues equations and null in the 
case of savings. This suggests that municipalities with a small amount of savings use the 
windfall to a larger extent to increase spending and less to cut taxes, with no overall 
effect on savings. Note that this behaviour is not consistent with a liquidity constraint, 
sincre this would require a higher level of savings. In any case, the quantitative effect of 
this variable is very small irrespective of the level of net savings, as it is revealed by a 
flat profile of the marginal effect graph (which is available upon request). It seems that 
Spanish municipalities were not liquidity constrained during the boom period. The 
results also reveal that the coefficients of the interaction with press circulation and vote 
margin are not affected by the inclusion of the interaction with net savings.  
To discard that these results are due to the particular variable used to proxy for 
liquidity constraints, we repeated the analysis using other variables: debt burden per 
capita, ordinary revenues per capita, and net savings and debt burden as a percentage of 
ordinary revenues. None of these variables seem to have any influence on the reaction of 
budget variables to construction revenue windfalls (results are available upon request). 
Table 7 inquires into the role of irrational expectations. We include in the 
equations an interaction between the windfall variable and a proxy for the degree of 
persistence of construction revenues during the boom. The proxy of revenue 
persistence is computed as the coefficient of a regression between construction 
revenues per capita at the peak of the boom (2004-2007) and construction revenues 
during the period 1999-2003. We use municipal level data to estimate a different value 
for each province. The average value of the estimated value is 1, indicating a high degree 
of persistence across the different phases of the boom. The value of this indicator is 
however quite heterogeneous, going from 0.5 to 1.5, with a standard deviation of 0.2. 
The results obtained when introducing this interaction alone are reported in columns 
(1), (4) and (7) of Table 7 for spending, savings and tax revenues, respectively. The 
interaction coefficient is not statistically significant, but a look at the marginal effects 
(available upon request) would reveal that the reaction to windfalls changes with the 
degree of revenue persistence. This effect, however, vanishes once we introduce again 
the interactions with press circulation and vote margin. Note that now the coefficient of 
the interaction with revenue persistence drops to a very low value and the standard 
errors grew also a lot. Note also that the coefficients on the interactions with the fiscal 
myopia proxies are very similar to the ones reported in Table 5.  
Table 7: Irrational expectations. Boom period. 2SLS results. 
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Notes:  (1)  All equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects. See Tables 2 & 3. (2) 
See Table A.1 for definitions of the different budget items analysed. (3) K-P statistic: Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F-
statistic; in brackets Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values at 10%/15% and 20% maximal IV bias. 
Again, to discard that these results are due to the use of a particular variable, we 
repeat the estimation using other proxies of the intensity of the housing boom: average 
annual growth rate of housing prices during the boom and average annual rate of 
housing construction. The results are very similar to those of Table 7: the interaction 
coefficient is very small and not statistically significant and the results regarding voter 
information and electoral competition remain. The results also remain when we use 
other variables (i.e., % of college educated or tenure in office) to run the horserace the 
fiscal myopia and the irrational expectations stories. Summing up, the results presented 
in this section suggest that the municipalities with less informed voters and more 
contested elections reacted to the windfall with larger spending increases and tax cuts. 
Municipalities experiencing more financial trouble or in the midst of a more intense 
housing boom do not seem to have a lower propensity to save during the boom.  
4.4. The bust  
In this section we present the results of the estimation of the effect of the construction 
revenue windfall obtained during the boom on the evolution of the different fiscal 
outcomes during the bust. We first describe the average results and then look again into 
the heterogeneous responses.   
Average results. The methodology used to estimate the effect of boom windfalls on the 
reactions during the bust is the same than the one used for the boom. Also, being the 
treatment variable and the instrument the same in the two cases, we are going to use 
also the same 2SLS specification than before. Therefore, for reasons of space, we only 
present the average results for the detailed spending and revenue categories shown in 
the Table 4 above for the boom period. The results for the bust are presented in Table 8 
below. Several results are worth highlighting. First, for each 100 euros of construction 
windfalls during the boom, spending is cut by 71 euros during the subsequent bust. 
Second, around 70% of this cut corresponds to capital spending (51 euros) and just 30% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
(a) Spending p.c. (eboom) (b) Savings p.c. (sboom) (c) Tax revenues p.c. (tboom) 
Construction revenues 
p.c (cboom) 
0.638 
(2.82)*** 
0.647 
(2.12)** 
0.630 
(2.32)*** 
0.189 
(1.42) 
0.234 
(1.68)* 
0.242 
(1.83)* 
-0.100 
(-1.94)* 
-0.120 
(-2.00)** 
-0.121 
(-2.18)** 
   Revenue persistence 0.567 
(1.21) 
0.002 
(0.032) 
0.032 
(0.210) 
0.123 
(1.02) 
0.001 
(0.021) 
0.024 
(0.165) 
-0.092 
(-1.17) 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
-0.005 
(-0.33) 
   Press  circulation  p.c. 
--.-- 
-0.020 
(-2.04)** 
--.-- --.-- 
0.021 
(2.45)*** 
--.-- --.-- 
0.003 
(0.63) 
--.-- 
   % Vote margin 
--.-- --.-- 
-0.020 
(-1.54) 
 
 
--.-- --.-- 
0.014 
(1.60) 
--.-- --.-- 
0.001 
(0.42) 
K-P statistic 10.23 8.44 7.55 10.23 8.44 7.55 10.23 8.44 7.55 
 [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] 
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corresponds to current spending (20 euros). Recall that the increase in total spending 
during the boom was of a similar dimension (65 euros), but was allocated mainly to 
current rather than to capital spending (45 vs. 19 euros). Notice also that wage spending 
is not adjusted at all during the bust, while it absorbed a considerable proportion of the 
windfall during the boom (28 euros or around 40% of the spending increase). Thus, it 
appears that increases in some spending categories are very tempting during boom 
periods and yet very difficult to reverse during busts. Third, the rest of the adjustment 
during the bust corresponds to a decrease in savings of around 16 euros and a tax 
increase of 14 euros. The savings coefficient is somewhat smaller than the one 
corresponding to the boom, and the one of taxes is larger. This might be indicative of the 
pressure to adjust the budget felt by municipalities during the bust. 
Table 8: Average effect during the Bust. 2SLS results. 
        Spending 
   Total Capital Current Wage  Purchases Transfers 
              
Construction rev. p.c 
(cboom) 
-0.713 
(-3.06)** 
-0.511 
(-2.68)*** 
-0.202 
(-2.44)** 
0.020 
(0.33) 
-0.129 
(-2.73)*** 
-0.076 
(-2.71)*** 
        
Savings 
Tax Revenues 
Grants   Total Property Other 
      
      Construction rev. p.c 
(cboom) 
-0.160 
(-1.67)* 
0.140 
(1.89) * 
0.100 
(1.72)* 
0.039 
(0.32) 
0.020 
(0.21) 
            Notes: (1) The table reports 2SLS estimates of the effects of the increase in construction revenues p.c. 
during the boom (1995-2007) on several budget items during the bust (2007-2011). (2) The instrument 
used is the amount of vacant land p.c. in 1995; in the estimation we control for urban area and distance-to-
central-city interval fixed effects. (3) See Tables 2 and 3. 
Finally, note that intergovernmental grants play no role in the adjustment. There is 
therefore no evidence that governments that spend the windfall during the boom were 
compensated either by an automatic increase in formula transfer or through a bailout 
grant when these revenues vanished during the bust. This suggest that reason that 
governments over-spent during the boom was not that they though that someone would 
help them if these revenues end up disappearing later on. 
Table 9: Fiscal myopia. Bust period. 2SLS results. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
(a) Spending p.c. (eboom) (b) Savings p.c. (sboom) (c) Tax revenues p.c. (tboom) 
Construction revenues 
p.c (cboom) 
-0.726 
(-4.15)*** 
-0.713 
(-3.04)*** 
-0.722 
(-2.66)** 
-0.160 
(1.66)* 
-0.170 
(-1.73)* 
-0.161 
(1.59) 
0.137 
(1.89)* 
0.145 
(2.32)** 
0.143 
(2.18)** 
   Press  circulation  p.c. 0.001 
(1.18) 
--.-- 
0.001 
(1.23) 
0.003 
(1.41) 
--.-- 
0.002 
(1.34) 
0.009 
(2.15)** 
--.-- 
0.009 
(2.04)** 
   % Vote margin 
--.-- 
0.001 
(1.11) 
 
 
0.001 
(1.04) 
 
 
--.-- 
0.009 
(0.93) 
0.093 
(1.23) 
--.-- 
0.011 
(1.30) 
0.011 
(1.28) 
K-P F-statistic 9.56 9.11 7.30 9.556 9.11 7.30 9.556 9.11 7.30 
 [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] 
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Notes:  (1)  All equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects. See Tables 2 & 3. (2) 
See Table A.1 for definitions of the different budget items analysed. (3) K-P F-statistic: Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F-
statistic; in brackets Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values at 10%,15% and 20% maximal IV bias. 
 
Heterogeneous effects. In this section we study whether there are differences among 
municipalities in the speed and type of adjustment to the loss of construction revenues 
experienced during the bust. We inquire into whether municipalities with secular low 
levels of voter information and high levels of electoral competition also behaved 
differently during the bust. In Table 9 we present the results for the interactions with 
press circulation and vote margin. The results for the other proxies of fiscal myopia are 
very similar to these ones and are available upon request. The results reported in the 
table suggest that municipalities with higher press circulation and larger voter margins 
enact smaller spending cuts. Note, however, that these municipalities actually enact 
larger tax increases and, as a result they end up suffering from lower deficits. Note also 
that (with the exception of tax revenues) the coefficients for spending and savings are 
much smaller than the ones corresponding to the boom period and that the standard 
errors are larger (compare with Table 5).  
Figure 5 displays the marginal effects corresponding to press circulation and vote 
margin for the three fiscal outcomes analysed. Note how spending cuts are smaller in 
the municipalities with lower levels of press circulation (at one standard deviation 
below the mean we can not discard that the value is one). In contrast, municipalities 
with high press circulation also enact much higher tax increases (at one standard 
deviation below the mean there are no tax increases while at one standard deviation 
above the mean we can reject the null that tax increases are zero). As a result the impact 
on savings also grows with press circulation. The point estimate is zero at one standard 
deviation above the mean while a deficit of around -0.3 arises at one standard deviation 
below the mean. In any case, we cannot reject that the marginal effects are zero at 5% 
level, irrespective of the level of press circulation. The effect is similar in the case of 
electoral competition. The main difference is that in this case the reaction of spending 
does not depend at all on the voter margin. The vote margin does matter however for 
the reaction of taxes. Municipalities with high vote margins are able to raise taxes more 
and thanks to that they do not run a deficit. Again, the result on the deficit is fragile, 
since we are not able to reject the null that the effect is zero at one deviation below the 
mean.  
Figure 5: Fiscal myopia. Bust period. Marginal effects. 
(i) Spendinc p.c. (eboom) (ii) Savings p.c. (sboom) (iii) Tax revenues p.c. (tboom) 
Panel (a): Press circulation p.c. 
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Panel (a): % Vote margin 
   
Notes: (1) Effect of an increase in construction revenues during the boom at different levels of Press circulation and 
% Vote margin. (2) Marginal effects computed using results from column (3) of Table A.6. 
The differences in the effects of voter information and electoral competition 
between the boom and the bust might be due to the fact that two different effects are 
operating during the bust. First, places with uninformed voters and contested elections 
did not save during the boom, so they are in a worst situation at the start of the bust. 
These municipalities should enact larger spending cuts / higher tax increases. Second, 
also because of fiscal myopia, these local governments are likely to have more incentives 
to delay the adjustment, so cutting less spending and keeping taxes low. One effect 
might be countervailing the other, explaining the overall effects we find. Another 
explanation might be the existence of severe liquidity constraints during the bust. There 
is a lot of evidence that credit to local governments (and also to firms) dried up during 
the financial crisis (see, e.g., Bentolila et al., 2016). This might explain why the fiscal 
adjustment was so fast during the bust and also why even local governments with 
informed voters and not very competitive elections adjusted a lot the budget (by cutting 
spending but mainly by raising taxes). Note that although these municipalities behaved 
well during the boom they were probably not able to accumulate liquid assets during 
that period. Instead of that they probably just reduced their debt stock; in normal times, 
this would have been sufficient to obtain the required credit during the bust, but in the 
absence of liquidity they might also have had to cut spending/raise taxes. 
5. Conclusions 
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In this paper we have studied the effect of a large, temporary revenue windfall on local 
budgets, using data from Spanish municipalities during the housing boom-bust of 1995-
2011. As we have shown, Spanish local governments are overly reliant on taxes and 
other revenue sources associated with the construction sector. Revenues from these 
sources are, moreover, highly unstable, rising steeply during booms but virtually 
disappearing during busts. We have documented that, in addition to their temporary 
nature, these windfalls had a massive impact on local budgets both during the boom and 
the bust. Further, our results suggest that, on average, local governments saved only a 
very small proportion of these windfalls for leaner times, preferring to fund spending 
increases and to cut taxes, with a marked impact on current spending and, especially, 
wage spending. During the bust, when the windfall was converted into a shortfall, capital 
spending was cut abruptly while current spending proved resistant to cuts. Likewise, 
during the bust, deficits appeared and taxes were raised more than the corresponding 
cuts made during the boom. 
We also document that local government behaviour during the boom differed 
greatly depending on the level of voter information and electoral competition. In 
municipalities with high press circulation and less competitive elections, the boom 
windfalls were largely saved, while in municipalities with low levels of voter information 
and contested elections, these extraordinary revenues were mostly spent and (to lesser 
extent) used to reduce taxes. These results remained unchanged after considering 
alternative stories, as liquidity constraints or irrational expectations. These 
characteristics also matter for the response during the bust: places with less informed 
voters had to apply stronger spending adjustments, and these places and also those with 
more competitive elections were unable to raise taxes during the bust, so they ended up 
generating some deficits. The fact that places with more informed voters and less 
competitive elections choose to adjust the budget through tax increases (and not by 
generating deficits) might be due to the general scarcity of credit that afflicted local 
governments during the Great Recession.  
Given the findings, the question arises as to whether policy actions should be 
implemented to address this issue. Note, however, that Spanish local governments have 
been able to adjust fully to the impact of the construction-revenue crisis in a relatively 
short period. Yet, despite this adjustment, the excessive cyclical volatility of revenues 
and spending may constitute a real problem. For instance, abrupt cuts to infrastructure 
spending during a bust might be detrimental while an excessive amount of wage 
spending might also constitute a burden for the future. So, what solutions are available? 
First, the problem derives from the excessive volatility of revenues, which implies that 
actions should be taken to ensure that revenues related to land use are not a source of 
windfall gains. One suggestion that has already been forwarded is the creation of a 
‘rainy-day’ or stabilization fund, to be managed by the central government (see de la 
Fuente, 2014; Lago and Solé-Ollé, 2016). Second, it is of paramount importance that 
greater transparency in the management of these revenues (i.e., ensuring citizens are 
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aware of how they are put to use), and of finances in general, is achieved. The disclosure 
of information by Spanish municipalities has improved since the (thanks both to the 
increase in central government requirements and to a more aware citizenship), but more 
has to be done. 
Our results might be of interest for other countries where governments also rely on 
volatile revenue sources and, in particular, for developing countries that also make 
extensive use of construction revenues. For example, there is evidence that land 
conversion revenues generated during the recent housing boom in China had an adverse 
effect on fiscal management and governance at the local level (Kung and Chen, 2016). 
The World Bank and other institutions are worried about the spread of this problem to 
other countries as e.g., Brasil (Peterson, 2008). Policies to deal with this situation might 
include both a diversification of the revenue portfolio of local governments (i.e., 
revamping the more stable residential property tax), and increases in the transparency 
of the management of construction revenues. 
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Definition Sources 
 
(a) Budget variables 
Construction revenues  p.c. (Betterment tax (‘Impuesto sobre Incremento 
del Valor de los Terrenos de Naturaleza Urbana’) 
+ Construction tax (‘Impuesto sobre 
Construcciones Instalaciones y Obras) + 
Developers fees (‘Licencia de obras’ y ‘Cuotas de 
promotor’) + Land sales ( ‘Enajenación de 
terrenos) )/ Population 
  Ministerio de Hacienda y 
Administraciones Públicas: 
“Estadísticas sobre liquidaciones 
de los presupuestos de las 
Entidades Locales”, 
http://www.minhafp.gob.es/, 
several years 
Spending p.c. (Total spending (current + capital)) / Population 
Current spending p.c. (Spending on Wages, Purchases and Current 
transfers) /Population 
Capital spending p.c. (Public investment + Capital transfers) / Pop. 
Tax revenues p.c. (Total revenues (Taxes + Fees + Current + 
Capital grants) – Construction revenues) / Pop. 
Ordinary revenues p.c. (Revenues from Taxes + Fees – Construction 
taxes and Fees )/ Population 
Grants p.c. (Current + Capital grants )/ Population 
Debt burden p.c. (Interest + Debt principal )/ Population 
Net savings p.c. (Current revenues – Current spending – Debt 
principal)/ Population 
Revenue persistence Estimated coefficient of a regression between 
construction revenues per capita in 2004-07 and 
construction revenues per capita in 1999-2003 
 
 
(b) Housing variables 
Vacant land p.c. (v0) Amount of land (hectares) qualified as 
developable in the Master Plan but not yet 
developed at the start of the boom (in 1995) / 
Population 
  DCG, Dirección General del 
Catastro: “Estadísticas sobre 
ordenanzas fiscales del Impuesto 
sobre Bienes Inmuebles”, 
http://www. catastro.meh.es /, 
several years 
   INE, Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística: “Censo de Población y 
Viviendas”, several years 
 
 
   Corine Land Cover Project 1991 
   &  Natura 2000 digital maps 
Building density Amount of developed land / Population 
Property value p.c. 
 
Land suitable for 
development p.c. 
Assessed value of the housing stock / Population 
 
(Land under municipal jurisdiction – Protected 
land – Water bodies & wetlands – Land with 
slopes >15%) / Population 
Housing price growth Average growth rate of housing prices (per m2) 
in the urban area during 1995-2007 
  TINSA, Tasaciones Inmobiliarias 
https://www.tinsa.es 
 
 
INE, Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística: “Censo de Población y 
Viviendas” http://www.ine.es/, 
several year 
Housing construction rate New housing units build in the municipality 
during the period 1995-2007 as a % of the 
housing stock in 1995 
    Past housing construction 
rate 
Idem than housing construction rate but for the 
periods 1960-1986 and 1987-1995) 
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Definition Sources 
 
(c) Socio-economic variables 
Press readership p.c. Number of daily newspapers (excluding the 
sports ones) sold in the province/Population 
in the province  
Spanish media association (AIMC, 
www.aimc.es) 
Civic associations p.c. Number of associations in the province / 
Population 
Spanish Ministry of the Interior, 
Registro Nacional de Asociaciones, 
http://www.interior.gob.es/ 
% Vote margin   ((vote share first party – vote share second 
party), using data from the 1979, 1983, 1987 
and 1991 local elections)/ Total votes 
 
 
Ministerio del Interior, Base 
Histórica de Resultados Electorales, 
http://www. 
elecciones.mir.es/MIR/jsp 
/resultados index.htm, several 
years 
   
% Left vote  Vote share left wing parties, using data from 
the 1979, 1983, 1987 and 1991 local elections. 
Tenure in office Maximum  of Terms of office held by the same 
party since 1979 
Income p.c. Personal income / Population La Caixa: ‘Anuario Económico de 
España’,  several years 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population size Population   
% Old Resident population older than 65 / 
Population 
 
% College education  Resident population with a college degree / 
Population 
% Immigrants  Resident population born outside the 
EU/Population 
INE, Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística: “Censo de Población y 
Viviendas 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 
2001 and 2011” 
http://www.ine.es/ 
 
% Unemployed Resident population unemployed/population 
%Renters Rental housing units / housing units 
%Commuters Resident population working outside the 
municipality / population 
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Table A.2:  Determinants of Vacant land 
  
Dependent variable: Vacant land p.c. (v0) 
  
     
 Explanatory variables: (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
     
 
a) Housing demand  
  
Past housing growth (1987-1995)  10.211 
(5.92)*** 
11.045 
(6.36)*** 
4.032 
(0.85) 
3.045 
(0.72) 
Past housing growth (1960-1986) -2.281 
(-1.94)*** 
-1.622 
(-1.31) 
-0.431 
(-00.56) 
-0.522 
(-0.47) 
Population  -0.009 
(-1.77)* 
-0.009 
(-2.52)** 
-0.002 
(-1.10) 
-0.002 
(-1.12) 
     
    b) Preferences and fiscal stress 
  % Vote margin 
--.-- 
0.089 
(0.840) 
--.-- 
0.043 
(0.540) 
% Left vote  
--.-- 
-0.770 
(-0.842) 
--.-- 
-0.520 
(-1.442) 
Income p.c. 
--.-- 
-0.009 
(0.752) 
--.-- 
-0.005 
(0.833) 
% Tertiary education  
--.-- 
-0.261 
(-1.278) 
--.-- 
-0.202 
(-0.442) 
%Renters 
--.-- 
0.029 
(0.198) 
--.-- 
0.021 
(0.110) 
%Commuters 
--.-- 
-0.006 
(-0.617) 
--.-- 
-0.004 
(-0.341) 
Debt burden p.c. 
--.-- 
0.125 
(1.331) 
--.-- 
0.132 
(0.340) 
Spending p.c. 
--.-- 
0.087 
(0.882) 
--.-- 
0.101 
(0.103) 
Property value p.c. 
--.-- 
0.217 
(0.954) 
--.-- 
0.245 
(0.420) 
     
     
R2 (adj.) 0.256 0.251 0.356 0.351 
     
     
F-stat (a) 23.94 
(0.000) 
20.99 
(0.000) 
3.21 
(0.122) 
1.87 
(0.130) 
F-stat (b) 
--.-- 
0.72 
(0.587) 
--.-- 
0.38 
(0.687) 
F-stat (j & k) --.-- --.-- 
35.22 
(0.000) 
33.71 
(0.000) 
Urban area fixed effects (j) NO YES NO YES 
Distance-to-central city fixed effects (k) NO YES NO YES 
Notes: (1) Dependent variable is Vacant land per capita (in 1995); (2) Sample: municipalities larger 
than 1,000 inhabitants and with access to the main road network in larger Spanish urban areas 
(N=495); (2) t-statistic in parenthesis; ***. *** & *= statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels; standard errors clustered by province; (2) F-stat (a), F-stat (b) & F-stat (j & k) are the F-
statistic used for the test of joint significance of Housing demand variables, the Preferences  and Fiscal 
stress variables, and the urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects, respectively; 
values in parenthesis are standard errors. (3) Dependent variable is Vacant land p.c., measured as the 
amount zoned for development in 1995 but not yet developed, divided by resident population in 1995. 
See Table A.1 for definitions and sources of the variables. 
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Table A.3:  Effect of Vacant land on boom and pre-boom budget changes 
 Notes: (1) Effects on changes in different budget variables during the boom (i.e., from the period 1993-1995 to 
the period 2004-2007) and during the period previous to the boom (i.e., from 1993-95 to 1996-97); (2) All 
equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects; (3) Sample: municipalities 
larger than 1,000 inhabitants and with access to the main road network in larger Spanish urban areas 
(N=311); (4) t-statistic in parenthesis; ***. *** & *= statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; 
standard errors clustered by province. 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4:  Effect of Vacant land on alternative channels 
Notes: (1) Effects on changes in different outcomes from the period prior to the boom (1993-95) to the peak of 
the boom (2004-2007); (2) See Table A.1 for definitions of the variables; (3) All equations include urban area 
and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects; (4) Sample: municipalities larger than 1,000 inhabitants and 
with access to the main road network in larger Spanish urban areas (N=311); (5) t-statistic in parenthesis; ***. 
*** & *= statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels; standard errors clustered by province. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  over the boom period in:  over the pre-boom period in: 
 Spending p.c. 
(eboom) 
Savings p.c. 
(sboom) 
Tax revenues 
p.c. (tboom) 
Spending p.c. 
(e0) 
Savings p.c. 
(s0) 
Tax revenues 
p.c. (t0) 
Vacant land 
p.c. (v0) 
0.156 
(2.77)*** 
0.059 
(1.76)* 
-0.027 
(-1.95)* 
0.004 
(0.21) 
0.002 
(0.33) 
0.001 
(0.57) 
R2 (adj.) 0.362 0.281 0.299 0.112 0.098 0.075 
       
 (1)       (2)              (3)              (4)       (5)         (6)            (7) 
   over the boom period in: 
 Construction 
revenues 
Ordinary 
revenues 
Population 
growth 
Income 
per capita 
Building 
density 
% 
Immigrants 
% 
Young 
Vacant land 
p.c. (v0) 
0.234 
(4.21)*** 
0.042 
(2.23)** 
0.004 
(1.77)* 
0.001 
(0.34) 
-0.021 
(-0.23) 
-0.001 
(0.11) 
0.002 
(0.121) 
R2 (adj.) 0.406 0.302 0.256 0.220 0.110 0.162 0.154 
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Table A.5: Average effect on main budget items. OLS results. 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     
 
(a) Spending p.c. (eboom) 
      
      
Construction revenues p.c.  
(cboom) 
1.061 
(11.43)*** 
0.945 
(9.06)*** 
0.947 
(8.08)*** 
1.082 
(9.54)*** 
0.981 
(8.44)*** 
R2 0.433 0.585 0.595 0.589 0.619 
            
 (b) Savings p.c. (sboom) 
      
      
Construction revenues p.c.  
(cboom) 
  -0.033 
(-0.044) 
0.051 
(0.170) 
0.061 
(0.151) 
-0.056 
(-0.618) 
0.044 
(0.363) 
R2 0.107 0.371 0.393 0.401 0.428 
              
 (c) Tax revenues p.c. (tboom) 
  
      
Construction revenues p.c.  
(cboom) 
0.011 
 (0.211) 
-0.012 
(-0.343) 
-0.015 
(-0.763) 
-0.015 
(-0.191) 
-0.020 
(-0.77) 
R2 0.047 0.293 0.331 0.342 0.354 
            
Urban area fixed effects  NO YES YES YES YES 
Distance-to-central-city fixed effects  NO YES YES YES YES 
Housing demand shocks  NO NO YES NO NO 
Preferences and fiscal stress  NO NO NO YES NO 
Alternative channels  NO NO NO NO YES 
      
       Notes:  See Table 2. 
 
 
 
Table A.6: Fiscal myopia. Additional measures. Boom period. 2SLS results. 
Notes:  (1)  All equations include urban area and distance-to-central-city interval fixed effects. See Tables 2 & 3. (2) 
See Table A.1 for definitions of the different budget items analysed. (3) K-P F-statistic: Kleiberger-Paap Wald rk F-
statistic; in brackets Stock-Yogo weak identification test critical values at 10%,15% and 20% maximal IV bias. 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
(a) Spending p.c. (eboom) (b) Savings p.c. (sboom) (c) Tax revenues p.c. (tboom) 
Construction revenues 
p.c (cboom) 
0.638 
(2.82)*** 
0.634 
(2.77)*** 
0.634 
(2.77)*** 
0.189 
(1.42) 
0.225 
(2.01)** 
0.236 
(2.01)** 
-0.100 
(-1.95)* 
-0.116 
(-2.02)** 
-0.123 
(-2.23)** 
   % College education -0.017 
(-2.29)** 
--.-- --.-- 
0.021 
(2.74)*** 
--.-- --.-- 
0.003 
(0.67) 
--.-- --.-- 
   Tenure in office 
--.-- 
-0.010 
(-1.62) 
 
 
--.-- --.-- 
0.015 
(1.53) 
--.-- --.-- 
0.001 
(0.32) 
--.-- 
   Civic associations p.c. 
--.-- --.-- 
0.002 
(0.08) 
 
--.-- --.-- 
0.001 
(0.13) 
--.-- --.-- 
0.000 
(0.28) 
K-P F-statistic 9.91 9.44 8.67 9.91 9.44 8.67 9.91 9.44 8.67 
 [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] [7.03 / 4.58 / 3.95] 
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Figure A.1:   
Construction revenues v. Ordinary taxes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) Ordinary taxes include revenues from taxes and fees not 
included in Construction revenues: (2) Revenues from ordinary taxes 
computed with constant tax rates and in real terms; (3) See Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure A.2:   
 Share of construction revenues in the budget in % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) Share of construction revenues measured over non-financial 
revenues; (2) Solid line is a Kernel epachenikov fit; dashed line is the 
mean of the respective period; (3) Outlay data; (4) See Table A.1 for 
definitions and data sources.  
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (www.minhac.es), “Base de 
datos de liquidaciones de los presupuestos de las Entidades Locales”. 
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Figure A.3:   
Growth of construction revenues. Boom & Bust. 
Boom Bust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Growth in construction revenues per capita. Boom: revenues in period 2004-2007 minus revenues in 
period 1993-1995; Bust: revenues in period 2008-11 minus revenues in period 2004-2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.4:  
Land use categories in Spain 
 
 
 
                                    
 
                                                                                                                                          
 
 
 
 
                   a) Before Plan amendment           b) After Plan amendment                        c)  After construction 
 
 
Notes: (1) Yellow: ‘Non-developable’ land (i.e., rural uses or protected); Orange: ‘Developed’ land before the 
amendment of the Master Plan (and before the construction that follows the implementation of the new 
plan); Pink: ‘Developable’ land before the amendment of the Master Plan (and also after); Purple: Developable 
land after the amendment of the plan but not before (i.e., amount of land converted from rural to urban uses 
between as a result of the amendment): Red: ‘Developed’ land with the new plan (i.e., construction that takes 
places once the new plan has been implemented). (2) The amount of vacant land at different moments is 
denoted with different colours: in graph (a) vacant land is denoted with Pink, in Panel (b) is Pink + Purple, 
and in Panel (c) is only Purple. 
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